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1. Introduction 
The research question addressed by this paper is a simple one: are European consumers happy 
with the services provided by the utilities after two decades of reforms?  Privatization, vertical 
disintegration and liberalization have extensively reshaped the structure of network industries 
(Newbery,2000), such as telephone, electricity, gas, and water  in the European Union since 
the 1980s, see e.g. Martin, Roma and Vansteenkiste (2005) for a survey. While empirical 
literature has usually focussed on changes in efficiency of the industry, rather surprisingly the 
research on the impact of utility reforms on consumers is less developed (with some notable 
exceptions, such as the research by Catherine Waddams  and associates, see e.g. recently  
Brazier et al 2006). Moreover, most of the empirical literature on this subject deals with 
individual countries, because of the difficulty of working with comparable cross-country 
evidence. 
While applied welfare economist would turn to objective evidence as their first choice of data 
for empirical analysis and evaluation of reforms, in this paper we explore perceptions by 
consumers, i.e. subjective data, on happiness with three dimensions of services of general 
interest (SGI): accessibility,price and quality. Thus we do not directly study whether utility 
reforms explain variations in welfare of consumers across countries and time periods, but 
whether they are correlated to their perceptions. There are two reasons to consider data on 
attitudes. First, because they are important per se. Policy-makers and regulators are well 
aware that reforms of services of general interests are in the forefront of public debate in the 
European Union (the widespread concern about the Bolkenstein Directive on the 
liberalization of services being a clear example), and it is then important to understand to 
what extent EU citizens are satisfied with the provision of SGI, changes over time and 
variations across countries. Second, subjective data can be a complement to objective 
evidence in order to evaluate the welfare impact of reforms. Ideally, for example, one would 
use both detailed microdata on price paid and expenditure by households, or on objectively 
measured quality, along with individual attitudes on these dimension of SGI, to test economic 
welfare change and compare them with ‘happiness’ measures. If the two measures  do not 
coincide, this fact would open the way to further research to understand whether the cognitive 
process by the consumer is biased, or whether the objective evidence does not capture aspects 
known to the user (e.g. aspects of quality, or of price discrimination not reflected in average 
price indexes). 
While in future research work we shall explore the combination of objective and subjective 
evidence to evaluate utility reforms, in this paper we focus exclusively on attitudes. We use 
three waves of Eurobarometer Surveys, 2000-2002-2004, for the EU 15 countries, and try to 
test the impact of privatization and regulatory reforms on attitudes of users of electricity, gas, 
telephone, water. To do so, after a discussion of our research motivation (Section 2),  
presentation of Eurobarometer data (Section 3), and descriptive statistics (Section 4), we 
estimate a set of ordered logit models (Section 5).  We regard the results as a preliminary 
exploration and in the Concluding section we discuss them and future research needed. 
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2. Research motivation 
Over the last twenty years governments and lawmakers of the Member States of the European 
Union have embarked on a wide range of reforms of public services. These include electricity, 
gas, telecommunications, water, railways, other public transport modes, postal services, and  
other services of general interest, previously fully or partly nationalized.  Following a 
dramatic reversal of policy trends, initiated in Great Britain in the early ‘80s (Florio, 2004), 
European governments have more or less enthusiastically or reluctantly divested their 
ownership of assets in network industries, and adopted large-scale privatization  policies.  
While the EU legislation is fairly neutral about ownership itself (except for its unambiguous 
hostility to uncompetitive State aids to public corporations), it strongly supports liberalization 
of service industries, most of them originally excluded by the scope of the directives on  the 
European markets integration. A continuous flow of EU directives (the framework legislation 
to be translated into national laws),  have provided for the opening of the service markets to 
competition, thus attempting to break legal or de facto monopoly power of the incumbent 
firms. In addition, antitrust powers of the European Commission have backed national 
competition policies.  Instrumental to liberalization policies, a set of structural changes have 
been made compulsory by EU legislation, most notably the vertical disintegration of network 
industries. An entirely new set of regulatory institutions has emerged as substitutes or 
complements of the competencies of ministries. A new paradigm has emerged, that tends to 
see privatization, liberalization, and vertical disintegration as germane policies. 
While the overall trend is clear and widespread, its timing and implementation shows 
considerable variations across the fifteen ‘old’ EU Members States and the ten new members 
that acceded in 2004. Moreover the outcome of the reforms is still under scrutiny. Supporters 
of the new paradigm have little doubts about the net social benefits of the reform process, but 
criticism on it is far from being overwhelmed by evidence. Some of the criticism against 
privatization and liberalization may be a reflection of vested interests in the incumbents, such 
as the trade unions or political patronage. There are however vested interests in the 
privatization and liberalization camp as well, and the political economy of the process is 
indeed a complex one (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003). Moreover, the economics of regulated 
industries, and occasional observation, show that under some circumstances the reforms can 
fail, for example when regulatory institutions are unable to contain new forms of market 
dominance after divestiture of state owned enterprises by privatized incumbents. Vertical 
disintegration is a particular area of concern, because there are indeed substantial costs 
associated to the separation of fixed capital and its operation: these costs that need to be 
evaluated case by case against the benefits of competition (Newbery, 2000). 
Because the jury is still out, the last word on the outcome of the reforms rests ultimately on 
empirical analysis. Consequently the evaluation of the success or failure of the privatization-
vertical disintegration-liberalization paradigm in the EU needs a careful analysis of its impact 
on society at large.  
It is apparent that, while there is a common direction of reform, substantial variations exist 
over time and across states. Empirical analysis should exploit this variability. 
As mentioned above, we are interested in the social outcome of reforms. This would imply a 
joint considerations of impacts on all social actors, including workers, shareholders, 
taxpayers, and consumers. Moreover ideally we would need to evaluate general equilibrium 
effects, because, for example, reforms of the electricity or transport industries may have an 
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impact on other industries, such as manufacturing.  
In order to make the evaluation more manageable, it would seem wise to break down the 
empirical analysis by types of agents, and focus on first round partial equilibrium impacts (as 
typically done by applied indirect tax reform literature, see Brau and Florio, 2004). After all, 
if consumers at large do not benefit directly from reforms, it seems unlikely that indirect 
benefits to them through impacts on other industries, or benefits to other agents, can change 
dramatically the evaluation. 
If we accept the above working hypothesis (i.e. we focus here on direct welfare changes of 
consumers) we need suitable welfare measures. In a standard cost-benefit analysis framework 
this implies to evaluate changes in consumer surplus along individual compensated demand 
curves, or to recur to other individual marginal welfare measures, such as compensated or 
equivalent variations. One crucial problem with this approach is that when moving to applied 
social impact analysis, we need knowledge of individual preferences, and of a social welfare 
function (to assign a weight to changes in consumer surplus). There are shortcuts to diminish 
the informative burden of this approach (Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1996; Brau and Florio, 
2003)  and we hope to be able to further explore it in future, but it still needs data not easy 
available in a European-wide perspective. Moreover, the informative cost of these shortcut 
welfare measures is that unavoidably individual data are skipped and substituted by more 
aggregated proxies. One example of the analytical cost involved in the process may clarify 
this point.  
On average, the own price elasticity of demand for water is low, reflecting the feature of a 
necessity good. Hence, under standard assumptions, the welfare effect of a price change as 
measured along a compensated demand function is low. Water consumers however are 
different types, and in turn water uses range from drinking and sanitation to swimming pools 
and car washing. Thus welfare effects and willingness to pay do change according the income 
and other traits of users. Moreover, income effects of water tariff rebalancing can be non-
marginal for the poor, and income effects should be considered, when no actual compensation 
is offered to reform losers. For example, the EBRD considers socially affordable water tariffs 
when expenditures are no more than 3% of income. For the bottom decile, however, the share 
of the bill on income can be substantially higher than the average, up to 10% in some 
transition countries, so that doubling water tariffs over some years may virtually extract 20% 
of income for some users (e.g. pensioners) in transition economies. Looking at the average or 
representative consumer of public service can thus be misleading to evaluate the social impact 
of reforms. 
The informative burden to look into individual agents is considerable, because we need to 
know preferences about different uses, price structures for type of users, and their income. 
This information at EU level is not available in comparable form across Member states. For 
example, we have comparable national data on the price per kWh by domestic users of 
electricity broken down by ranges of yearly consumption, but we do not have comparable 
information on the income of those users, or the number of individuals by each household. In 
spite of all the debate on reforms of public services, and a huge academic research on the 
topic, we are very far from availability of the very basic statistical information on welfare 
measures for utilities, and applied researchers need often to rely on crude and highly 
aggregate data.  
One strategy to preserve some micro information is to adopt a different empirical shortcut: 
instead of (or as a complement to) relying on revealed preference through the estimation of 
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individual compensated demand functions (or their proxies) we can turn to stated preferences, 
i.e. subjective well-being measures.  In other words, we ask consumers direct questions about 
their self- assessment of satisfaction. 
While this may look as a dramatic change of perspective in economic welfare analysis, it is in 
fact much less strong that it may appear when compared with actual practice of cost-benefit 
testing in project or policy evaluation. In fact, applied CBA, usually regarded as objective 
welfare evaluation and often officially endorsed by government agencies, routinely uses 
contingent evaluation methods e.g. in regulatory impact analysis (see Boardman at al, 2005 
for a survey of applied literature). Such methods revolve around eliciting direct information 
on willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept policy changes through surveys on users. 
To an applied welfare economist, using revealed or stated preferences is a matter of 
convenience and data availability more than a fundamental methodological divide. 
This discussion of empirical approaches to the evaluation of the welfare impact of policy 
reforms has a close resemblance with the wider debate on the merits of the ‘economics of 
happiness’ (Graham, forthcoming, Layard, 2005). The typical focus of this recent research 
avenue is the study of the relationship between subjective well being as self assessed by 
individuals, and objective macroeconomic welfare indicators, such as national income, 
inflation or unemployment (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). 
We propose to use a similar approach in a microeconomic context. Services of general interest 
are sufficiently important to influence perceptions of well being. While such perceptions can 
be wrong, they are of course based on the information set available to the respondent, plus an 
idiosyncratic bias. Thus, when a respondent says, in one country and in one year, that she 
evaluates the price or quality of water as ‘fair’, we can assume that she is telling us something 
about her subjective well being. It seems reasonable to assume that if an individual is happy 
with the price she pays, and the quality she gets for water, transport, gas and electricity, she is 
in a better (perceived) welfare position than somebody who feels to be compelled to pay too 
much for what she gets. The parallelism with happiness economics is here that while the latter 
research typically relates overall subjective well being to macroeconomic issues, here we 
focus on satisfaction on specific, albeit important consumption items.  
If there are variations across time and across countries in the frequency of those who assess 
the price of services as fair, we can try to understand the determinants of such differences. 
Privatization and regulatory reforms are shocks that have changed the structure of the industry 
considerably in the EU,  we want to test to what extent variability of attitudes are influenced 
by utility reforms. We turn to the variables to be explained in the next two sections. 
3. Eurobarometer data 
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (henceforth, EB) have been conducted on behalf of the 
Directorate-General for Education and Culture of the European Commission each spring and 
autumn since autumn 1973. They have included Greece since autumn 1980, Portugal and 
Spain since autumn 1985, the former German Democratic Republic since autumn 1990 and 
Austria, Finland and Sweden from spring 1995 onwards. 
An identical set of questions is asked to representative samples of the population aged fifteen 
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years and over in each Member State. In each household, the respondent is drawn at random. 
All interviews are face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language. A 
detailed analysis on the Eurobarometer data can be found on the official Eurobarometer Web 
site.2 The questions concern various aspects, including support and benefit for EU 
membership, support for a EU constitution, satisfaction with EU democracy and the single 
currency, general outlook on life and so on. 
The regular sample in standard Eurobarometer surveys is 1000 people per country except 
Luxembourg (600) and the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern 
Ireland). In order to monitor the integration of the five new Länder into unified Germany and 
the European Union, 2000 persons have been sampled in Germany since the Eurobarometer 
34: 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany. 
In each of the 15 Member States, the survey is carried out by national institutes associated 
with the “INRA (Europe) European Coordination Office”. This network of institutes was 
selected by tender. All institutes are members of the “European Society for Opinion and 
Marketing Research” (ESOMAR) and comply with its standards. 
Each survey comes with a set of weights obtained, using marginal and intercellular weighting, 
carried out on the basis of the population description provided by EUROSTAT in the 
Regional Statistics Yearbook (data for 1997 or 1996).  
In years 2000, 2002 and 20043 the Eurobarometer surveys included some questions 
concerning Services of General Interest (henceforth, SGI). The SGI considered are mobile 
telephone service, fixed telephone service, electricity supply service, gas supply service, water 
supply service, postal service, transport service within towns/cities and rail service between 
towns/cities. The criteria used to analyse these services are accessibility, the price of the 
services, the quality of the services, the clarity of the information aimed at EU consumers, 
how fair the terms and conditions of the contracts applicable to the services are, consumers’ 
complaints and how they are handled and customer service. 
The samples are considered as highly representative of national opinions; the composition of 
the sample comply with the standard rules for surveys (see Table 1). 
                                                 
2 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ 
3 For Europe, 2004 was an exceptional year in several ways. Four major events stand out in particular: the 
enlargement of the European Union to include ten new Member States; the European elections which have given 
a new look to the European Parliament which now has 732 MEPs; the prospect of the signature of the new 
Constitutional Treaty and, finally, the appointment of a new European Commission. This is the first time that 
such wide-ranging institutional and political changes have occurred in such a short period of time. This Standard 
Eurobarometer was organised therefore in a particularly eventful European context. Moreover, the results of this 
survey reflect these changes. Indeed, significant changes have been noted with regard to certain indicators which 
have been monitored over recent decades. It would appear, therefore, essential to bear in mind the atypical nature 
of this European year when analysing evolutions with regard to certain questions. Finally, for the first time, the 
Standard Eurobarometer covers 30 countries: the 25 Member States, the four candidate countries (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and Turkey) and the Northern part of Cyprus. It is also worthwhile emphasising that while the 
Eurobarometer survey of spring 2004 was conducted by EORG, since autumn 2004, the Standard Eurobarometer 
is carried out by TNS Opinion & Social, a consortium formed by TNS and EOS Gallup Europe. 
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Table 1. Sample composition for 2000, 2002 and 2004survey 
Sample Weight Sample 
 2000 2002 2004 2000 2002 2004 
Austria 1,005 1,008 1,007 343 346   339 
Belgium 1,063 1,074 1,000 430 460   437 
Denmark 1,000 1,000 1,059 223 223   222 
Finland 1,010 1,000 1,013 214 214   217 
France 1,002 1,004 1,001 2,416 2,426 2,235 
Germany 2,049 2,045 1,561 3,542 3,651 3,260 
Great Britain 1,370 1,320 1,322 2,437 2,472 2,422 
Greece 1,004 1,001 1,000 453 453   441 
Ireland 1,000 999 1,000 153 153   157 
Italy 1,000 992 1,018 2,523 2,503 2,499 
Luxembourg 600 599  506 19 19      19 
Netherlands 975 998 1,011 654 654   673 
Portugal 1,000 1,000 1,000 423 423   410 
Spain 1,000 1,000 1,031 1,700 1,700 1,823 
Sweden 1,000 1,000 1,000 370 370   375 
Total 16,078 16,040 15,529 15,900 16,067 15,529 
4. Descriptive statistics 
In this paper we restrict our attention to four SGI only (fixed telephone, electricity, gas and 
water supply services) along the three dimensions of access to services, price and quality of 
the service. For more details see Manzi, 2006. 
4.1. The fixed telephone service 
The lowest rate of accessibility satisfaction among European customers in 2000 (Table 1) is in 
Portugal: 10.69% of citizens declares that there is a difficult access and 5.34% of them that 
there is no access to fixed telephone network. On the opposite, Denmark and Luxembourg 
have the better access, with a rate of 98.2% and 100% respectively in 2000 of easy access to 
fixed telephone network. In terms of variation, between 2000 and 2002 Belgium has the 
largest positive difference of no access to telephone network and Italy the lowest, between 
2002 and 2004 Finland has the largest positive difference of no access to telephone network 
and Italy the lowest. It is important to notice the different situation in 2004 for Spain and 
Portugal: in Spain the percentage of easy access decreases and the percentage of difficult 
access increases, whereas the opposite is in Portugal.  
Opinion percentages on fixed telephone service prices are worse than the previous ones 
(Table 2). The overall percentages of fair judgement on service prices are only 51.65% in 
2000, even if this percentage increases slightly in 2002 (+1.56%) but drastically in 2004 
(+19,51). The only exception is Greece (-17.12 in 2002 and -11.19 in 2004). Among 
countries, the top one is Luxembourg with 72.22% in 2000, whereas Italy (with 26.24% of 
excessive and 45.25% of unfair) has the highest rates in considering unfair or excessive the 
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price of service, even if they remain almost constant in 2002 and decrease in 2004.  
Finally, quality has judged fairly or very bad in Italy, Greece and Portugal and very good in 
countries like Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg (Table 3). Quality level is generally 
considered better than price level: overall, a percentage of 91.41% of the EU15 citizens 
considers very or fairly good the telephone service quality in 2002. 
Table 2. Valid Answers on fixed telephone service access – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access 
Austria 4.97 6.52 88.51 -0.75 -1.70 2.45 -1.10 -0.72 1.81
Belgium 1.67 4.30 94.03 5.81 2.96 -8.77 2.03 1.49 -3.52
Denmark 1.36 0.45 98.18 0.43 -0.01 -0.42 3.22 3.67 -6.90
Finland 1.43 5.24 93.33 3.43 3.50 -6.93 4.18 5.51 -9.69
France 1.42 2.59 96.00 1.68 1.65 -3.33 1.35 2.00 -3.35
Germany 2.30 5.77 91.93 -0.48 1.42 -0.94 1.78 -1.03 -0.76
Great Britain 3.07 1.91 95.01 -0.15 0.76 -0.61 -0.62 0.34 0.28
Greece 1.57 6.73 91.70 -0.23 -1.83 2.06 0.25 -4.91 4.66
Ireland 5.33 2.67 92.00 0.63 -0.68 0.05 -1.33 0.00 1.33
Italy 8.95 3.67 87.38 -6.70 4.07 2.63 -5.48 4.78 0.70
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 -5.56
Netherlands 0.15 2.94 96.90 0.64 1.53 -2.18 0.61 0.86 -1.46
Portugal 5.34 10.69 83.97 4.12 -1.95 -2.17 -1.64 -5.25 6.89
Spain 0.66 5.43 93.90 -0.24 -0.25 0.49 4.07 11.01 -15.08
Sweden 2.98 1.08 95.93 -1.35 0.01 1.34 -2.18 -0.28 2.47
Total 3.20 4.07 92.73 -0.67 1.38 -0.71 0.12 2.12 -2.24
 
Table 3. Valid Answers on fixed telephone service prices – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair 
Austria 17.29 33.56 49.15 -10.67 3.20 7.47 -8.04 -29.15 37.19
Belgium 21.16 40.05 38.79 -9.82 -6.30 16.12 -9.66 -26.83 36.50
Denmark 5.63 34.74 59.62 -3.23 -14.07 17.30 -5.63 -23.75 29.39
Finland 1.48 34.98 63.55 -0.37 4.47 -4.10 -0.82 6.08 -5.27
France 18.62 29.29 52.09 -5.00 6.96 -1.96 -10.43 -2.60 13.04
Germany 2.56 32.71 64.72 0.86 -1.58 0.72 6.13 -28.28 22.15
Great Britain 5.45 24.04 70.51 -2.38 -1.84 4.23 -4.31 -14.88 19.19
Greece 13.80 35.52 50.68 -5.81 22.93 -17.12 -2.41 13.59 -11.19
Ireland 12.31 23.08 64.62 -5.06 3.01 2.05 1.29 -7.08 5.78
Italy 26.24 45.25 28.51 -1.26 4.38 -3.11 -6.99 -7.35 14.34
Luxembourg 16.67 11.11 72.22 5.56 5.56 -11.11 -11.11 11.11 0.00
Netherlands 10.34 29.94 59.72 -3.04 0.91 2.13 -2.73 -15.51 18.24
Portugal 11.93 60.24 27.83 -4.15 -6.18 10.33 -5.34 -21.48 26.82
Spain 19.45 49.52 31.02 -11.29 5.11 6.18 -8.55 -20.51 29.06
Sweden 5.98 34.19 59.83 -3.75 -4.86 8.61 -4.60 -15.63 20.23
Total 12.99 35.36 51.65 -3.46 1.89 1.56 -4.16 -15.35 19.51
 
Table 4. Valid Answers on fixed telephone service quality – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
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2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good 
Austria 1.03 4.11 43.15 51.71 -0.69 0.22 3.85 -3.38 -1.03 -0.62 4.88 -3.24
Belgium 0.75 2.01 58.65 38.60 -0.50 0.00 -7.77 8.27 0.11 -0.01 -8.08 7.97
Denmark 0.00 2.79 38.60 58.60 0.47 -0.91 3.18 -2.74 0.54 0.45 -2.93 1.94
Finland 0.49 1.47 50.98 47.06 0.06 0.18 8.36 -8.60 0.17 3.79 5.60 -9.56
France 0.55 3.74 56.94 38.77 -0.46 0.55 7.07 -7.16 -0.06 1.54 6.10 -7.57
Germany 1.02 4.57 62.61 31.80 -0.05 1.98 2.61 -4.53 -0.28 -0.08 -5.28 5.64
Great Britain 0.61 3.61 48.28 47.50 0.08 -1.72 1.95 -0.31 0.38 -0.19 3.26 -3.45
Greece 1.82 7.06 62.19 28.93 1.81 3.60 -1.64 -3.76 -1.06 0.51 6.75 -6.20
Ireland 0.00 2.21 37.50 60.29 0.70 -0.09 -0.18 -0.43 0.00 0.94 3.44 -4.39
Italy 2.08 8.50 72.26 17.17 0.24 5.62 -1.36 -4.51 0.09 2.92 0.79 -3.80
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 44.44 55.56 0.00 5.56 -5.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.61 -2.61
Netherlands 0.15 2.77 44.84 52.23 0.64 0.09 11.05 -11.79 0.32 -0.23 -6.14 6.05
Portugal 0.30 7.90 79.03 12.77 0.04 -1.70 6.83 -5.18 0.46 -2.96 5.76 -3.26
Spain 0.82 9.45 73.03 16.69 0.06 0.67 -7.00 6.27 0.32 1.27 -7.34 5.76
Sweden 0.28 1.40 43.14 55.18 0.00 0.53 -5.84 5.32 -0.01 0.77 -8.90 8.13
Total 0.93 5.23 59.89 33.94 0.06 1.36 1.56 -2.98 0.02 0.72 -1.01 0.28
4.2. The electricity service 
Similar rates are recorded in 2000, 2002 and 2004 for electricity service (Table 4). Denmark 
and Luxembourg have the better accessibility satisfaction, having a rate of 100% of easy 
access to electricity network. On the contrary, Greece, Austria and Germany have the worst 
situation. Considering all the EU15 countries altogether, a percentage of 95.27% of easy 
access answers is registered in 2000 but this service lose accessibility  during the two 
following periods. This tendency is more dramatic in Italy than in others EU15 countries: in 
this country the percentage of easy access decreases (-10.58% in 2002 and -10.86% in 2004) 
whereas both the percentage of difficult access and the percentage of no access increase 
(7.89% in 2002 and 8.32% in 2004, 2.69% in 2002 and 2.54% in 2004, respectively). These 
trends seem to be counter-intuitive and may need further analysis about the understanding of 
the question and cross-checking with objective evidence. 
Like in the case of the fixed telephone service, also in the case of the electricity service price 
levels are considered worse than the accessibility (Table 5), but ranks in preferences are 
similar. The overall percentage of fair judgement of service prices is only 58.69%. Among 
countries, Luxembourg with 83.33% in 2000 has the best rate, whereas Italy (with 20.98% of 
Excessive and 32.58% of  Unfair answers) as well as Portugal (with 11.74% of Excessive and 
49.88% of Unfair answers) have the highest rates of unfair and excessive answers about the 
levels of electricity service prices. In 2002 Ireland registered the highest positive difference in 
judging unfair the prices (+15.51%), whereas Belgium registered the lowest one (-11.55% of 
Unfair and -7.48% of Excessive). In 2004 Finland registered the highest positive difference in 
judging unfair the price levels (+23.96%) and Belgium again registered the lowest one           
(-25.56).  
Finally, quality has been judged fairly or very bad in Italy, Greece and Portugal, very or fairly 
good in Denmark, Sweden and Ireland (Table 6). Quality standards are generally regarded the 
same way as price levels: overall, a percentage of 95.34% of the EU15 citizens considers very 
or fairly good the electricity service quality in 2000. This percentage does not significantly 
change in 2002 and 2004.  
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Table 5. Valid Answers on electricity service access – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access 
Austria 3.36 4.89 91.74 -2.17 1.10 1.07 -1.11 1.86 -0.75
Belgium 0.24 5.04 94.72 1.35 3.16 -4.52 0.22 4.45 -4.68
Denmark 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 3.21 -3.67
Finland 0.48 2.88 96.63 0.00 1.92 -1.92 -0.02 3.13 -3.12
France 0.42 2.36 97.22 0.09 3.92 -4.01 -0.10 4.18 -4.08
Germany 1.99 7.60 90.41 -0.40 1.25 -0.85 1.45 -1.30 -0.15
Great Britain 0.33 0.71 98.96 0.17 2.66 -2.82 -0.08 0.88 -0.80
Greece 0.67 7.64 91.69 -0.45 -0.90 1.35 -0.67 -4.91 5.59
Ireland 0.00 1.33 98.67 0.66 -0.01 -0.65 0.00 -0.02 0.02
Italy 0.00 4.84 95.16 2.69 7.89 -10.58 2.54 8.32 -10.86
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 5.26 -5.26 0.00 5.56 -5.56
Netherlands 0.32 2.52 97.16 -0.15 4.82 -4.67 0.30 6.75 -7.05
Portugal 0.00 3.82 96.18 0.24 4.81 -5.05 0.49 0.59 -1.08
Spain 0.24 4.02 95.74 -0.12 2.12 -1.99 1.04 9.65 -10.69
Sweden 1.36 1.36 97.28 -1.08 1.39 -0.30 -1.36 0.25 1.11
Total 0.71 4.03 95.27 0.34 3.27 -3.61 0.75 3.36 -4.11
Table 6. Valid Answers on electricity service  prices – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair 
Austria 11.15 28.98 59.87 -4.09 -0.45 4.54 4.96 -21.86 16.91
Belgium 16.95 38.57 44.47 -7.48 -11.55 19.04 -7.51 -25.56 33.08
Denmark 3.21 24.77 72.02 1.01 2.93 -3.94 -2.24 -10.69 12.93
Finland 1.47 34.80 63.73 -0.49 3.24 -2.75 0.59 23.96 -24.55
France 16.85 26.11 57.04 -5.70 7.12 -1.42 -9.74 1.29 8.45
Germany 3.44 35.91 60.65 -0.51 -0.64 1.15 14.35 -24.34 9.98
Great Britain 4.63 17.83 77.54 -3.16 -2.55 5.71 -3.92 -7.79 11.71
Greece 12.13 37.08 50.79 -0.42 12.70 -12.27 2.25 15.89 -18.14
Ireland 7.86 12.86 79.29 0.65 15.51 -16.17 5.81 2.97 -8.78
Italy 20.98 32.58 46.45 0.23 9.66 -9.89 -5.12 2.44 2.68
Luxembourg 11.11 5.56 83.33 0.65 6.21 -6.86 -11.11 14.44 -3.33
Netherlands 5.32 19.63 75.04 -1.18 3.51 -2.33 0.42 -8.83 8.41
Portugal 11.74 49.88 38.39 -5.47 -1.26 6.73 -5.07 -13.21 18.28
Spain 12.75 39.58 47.67 -7.16 3.89 3.27 -4.67 -13.81 18.48
Sweden 5.40 31.25 63.35 -2.52 5.53 -3.01 -1.42 13.64 -12.22
Total 10.76 30.54 58.69 -2.95 3.09 -0.14 -0.99 -8.31 9.30
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Table 7. Valid Answers on electricity service quality – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good 
Austria 0.00 1.86 29.72 68.42 0.00 2.57 5.38 -7.95 0.37 0.34 13.14 -13.84
Belgium 0.24 1.91 56.70 41.15 -0.24 0.55 -6.92 6.61 0.01 0.10 -6.70 6.59
Denmark 0.00 0.45 30.49 69.06 0.00 0.92 0.10 -1.02 0.00 0.51 -2.13 1.61
Finland 0.00 0.48 50.00 49.52 0.48 1.92 4.81 -7.21 0.51 3.60 6.12 -10.23
France 0.08 2.26 55.89 41.76 0.00 -0.08 6.60 -6.52 0.64 -1.20 3.84 -3.28
Germany 0.90 5.83 59.79 33.48 -0.54 -0.61 0.83 0.32 -0.71 -3.19 -4.43 8.34
Great Britain 0.63 2.40 43.85 53.12 -0.13 -0.69 1.60 -0.78 0.24 -0.10 7.91 -8.05
Greece 0.92 7.57 57.11 34.40 1.09 3.82 1.15 -6.06 -0.23 2.93 10.01 -12.71
Ireland 0.00 1.34 26.85 71.81 0.66 -0.68 3.62 -3.60 0.00 0.04 8.33 -8.36
Italy 0.77 6.89 72.09 20.25 0.28 4.05 1.86 -6.19 -0.40 2.30 4.64 -6.53
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 38.89 61.11 0.00 0.00 2.29 -2.29 0.00 0.00 8.17 -8.17
Netherlands 0.16 0.95 40.03 58.86 0.17 2.85 14.18 -17.21 0.19 2.85 -2.04 -1.00
Portugal 0.24 7.18 79.43 13.16 0.72 1.94 2.59 -5.24 0.01 -0.85 4.62 -3.79
Spain 0.96 3.78 74.59 20.66 -0.54 5.34 -9.83 5.03 0.42 3.66 -4.69 0.62
Sweden 0.00 2.49 37.40 60.11 0.55 0.55 -5.82 4.71 0.55 1.88 -2.70 0.27
Total 0.57 4.09 57.77 37.57 -0.07 1.36 1.15 -2.44 0.02 0.13 1.18 -1.33
4.3.  Gas supply services 
The analysis on gas supply service is deeply influenced by the large rate of no accessibility 
recorded in many countries. Greece, Finland and Sweden have rates higher than or near 50% 
in 2000. The Netherlands took in 2000 the highest rate of easy accessibility to the gas supply 
service (96.99%) (Table 7). The Greeks answered that they didn’t have any access in 96.71% 
of the cases in 2000 (but this percentage decreased of 8.71% in 2002 and 19.04% in 2004) 
and the Swedish in 91.29% of the cases in 2000. Considering all the EU15 countries 
altogether, a percentage of 81.62% of easy access answers is registered in 2000, whereas in 
2002 and 2004 these percentages decrease (-5.36% and -9.44%, respectively).  
Table 8 shows the distribution of fair, unfair or excessive answers on gas supply service 
prices. The overall percentage of fair judgement on service prices is only 60.84% in 2000, but 
it increases in 2002 (+1.1%) and in 2004 (+8.96%). Among countries, the top one is Greece 
with 87.5% in 2000, whereas Italy (with 22.80% of Excessive answers) and Portugal (with 
50.46% of Unfair answers) have the lowest fair answer rates. In 2002 Greece registered the 
highest positive difference in judging unfair or excessive the price levels, whereas Belgium 
registered the lowest one; in 2004 Germany registered  the lowest positive difference in 
judging unfair the prices and the highest positive difference in judging excessive them, 
whereas Luxembourg obtained diametrically reverse results 
Service quality has been judged fairly or very bad in Italy, Portugal and Greece and very or 
fairly good in countries like Denmark, Sweden and Ireland (Table 9). Quality standards are 
generally considered almost in the same way as price levels: overall, a percentage of  94.32% 
of the EU15 citizens considers very or fairly good the gas supply service quality in 2000. This 
percentage does not significantly change in 2002 and 2004.  
Table 8. Valid Answers on gas supply services access – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
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2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access 
Austria 12.64 9.39 77.98 15.74 0.99 -16.73 3.78 -1.18 -2.61
Belgium 4.68 7.39 87.93 10.91 1.24 -12.15 12.48 0.94 -13.42
Denmark 39.18 6.19 54.64 12.82 -0.69 -12.14 18.91 0.38 -19.29
Finland 50.34 19.46 30.20 26.88 -8.07 -18.81 18.66 -2.46 -16.20
France 9.77 4.00 86.23 3.64 3.88 -7.52 6.41 4.64 -11.05
Germany 13.24 9.04 77.72 6.92 0.72 -7.64 12.26 -0.32 -11.93
Great Britain 4.26 2.02 93.72 2.87 1.65 -4.52 6.74 4.72 -11.46
Greece 96.71 0.76 2.53 -8.71 4.24 4.47 -19.04 11.15 7.89
Ireland 36.30 5.19 58.52 2.69 -0.95 -1.74 -6.30 0.97 5.33
Italy 4.94 6.05 89.00 1.86 5.94 -7.80 -1.92 5.44 -3.52
Luxembourg 22.22 5.56 72.22 11.11 0.00 -11.11 7.19 0.33 -7.52
Netherlands 0.48 2.54 96.99 0.55 5.01 -5.57 1.10 5.33 -6.42
Portugal 9.18 9.69 81.12 -3.92 1.83 2.09 -1.68 -0.94 2.63
Spain 1.43 7.25 91.32 -0.67 -0.57 1.24 8.84 6.19 -15.03
Sweden 91.29 2.10 6.61 0.00 -0.49 0.49 -1.77 1.58 0.19
Total 12.63 5.75 81.62 3.07 2.30 -5.36 5.82 3.62 -9.44
Table 9. Valid Answers on gas supply service  prices – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair 
Austria 9.78 24.46 65.76 -1.35 7.47 -6.12 8.24 -14.55 6.31
Belgium 13.99 37.03 48.98 -6.65 -14.09 20.75 -7.19 -24.26 31.45
Denmark 3.61 21.69 74.70 -0.80 -1.97 2.77 -1.44 -10.82 12.26
Finland 5.00 32.50 62.50 0.56 -4.72 4.17 -5.00 -3.93 8.93
France 9.93 19.92 70.14 -1.98 11.73 -9.75 -2.65 5.71 -3.05
Germany 3.66 38.31 58.03 0.60 -3.71 3.12 18.08 -26.15 8.07
Great Britain 3.76 17.32 78.92 -2.47 -3.54 6.01 -3.04 -7.85 10.89
Greece 0.00 12.50 87.50 16.67 20.83 -37.50 0.00 -12.50 12.50
Ireland 4.62 10.77 84.62 -1.11 6.77 -5.67 2.53 5.30 -7.83
Italy 22.80 34.69 42.50 -2.35 4.76 -2.40 -6.79 -2.00 8.79
Luxembourg 8.33 8.33 83.33 1.67 1.67 -3.33 -8.33 13.89 -5.56
Netherlands 5.72 21.55 72.73 -1.58 -0.11 1.69 -0.61 -10.21 10.82
Portugal 8.92 50.46 40.62 -4.35 -8.75 13.10 -2.56 -15.92 18.48
Spain 9.40 35.94 54.67 -5.45 2.26 3.19 -1.98 -9.58 11.56
Sweden 4.76 23.81 71.43 -0.41 -6.42 6.83 -4.76 -3.81 8.57
Total 9.75 29.41 60.84 -2.26 1.15 1.10 -0.05 -8.91 8.96
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Table 10. Valid Answers on gas supply service quality – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good 
Austria 2.56 2.56 36.92 57.95 -2.00 5.91 2.06 -5.97 -1.66 1.04 1.82 -1.19
Belgium 0.85 2.56 55.27 41.31 -0.85 -0.19 -6.61 7.65 -0.43 -1.30 -5.27 7.01
Denmark 0.00 0.00 31.33 68.67 0.00 1.37 2.92 -4.29 0.00 0.00 1.28 -1.28
Finland 2.38 2.38 69.05 26.19 3.50 3.50 -4.34 -2.66 -2.38 -2.38 -11.90 16.67
France 0.00 2.31 56.41 41.27 0.11 1.05 3.31 -4.48 0.62 -1.16 2.54 -2.00
Germany 1.13 7.93 59.21 31.73 -0.54 -0.18 2.28 -1.55 -1.13 -5.87 1.38 5.62
Great Britain 1.05 2.75 42.90 53.30 -0.27 -1.28 2.98 -1.42 -0.35 -0.97 8.85 -7.52
Greece 7.69 0.00 38.46 53.85 19.58 9.09 16.08 -44.76 -7.69 0.00 -13.46 21.15
Ireland 0.00 2.82 26.76 70.42 3.17 -1.23 4.99 -6.93 0.00 -1.09 11.17 -10.08
Italy 1.14 6.38 71.14 21.34 0.09 2.74 2.27 -5.09 -0.92 1.34 8.51 -8.93
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 46.15 53.85 0.00 0.00 -6.15 6.15 0.00 0.00 3.85 -3.85
Netherlands 0.16 0.65 39.35 59.84 0.01 1.58 14.25 -15.83 0.02 2.43 -2.69 0.24
Portugal 0.30 9.97 76.44 13.29 1.37 -1.61 5.74 -5.49 0.00 -3.26 9.54 -6.28
Spain 1.81 4.92 75.00 18.26 -0.82 0.60 -6.05 6.27 -0.73 1.92 -0.44 -0.75
Sweden 0.00 4.76 38.10 57.14 4.55 -0.22 -1.73 -2.60 0.00 -4.76 -13.10 17.86
Total 0.96 4.72 58.66 35.66 -0.19 0.65 1.98 -2.44 -0.48 -0.75 4.23 -3.00
4.4. Water supply services 
As in the case of the electricity service, Denmark and Luxembourg have the better 
accessibility, having a rate of 100% of easy access to the water supply service (Table 10). In 
2002 in Italy there was an increase of 2.7% of no access (whereas in 2000 nobody declared to 
have no access to water network) and the percentage of people declaring to have difficult 
access increases of 5.37% (whereas the percentage of easy accesses decreases of 8.09%). A 
similar situation stands in Spain in 2004: the percentage of difficult access increases (+6.99%) 
whereas the percentage of easy access decreases (-8.93%). Considering the EU15 countries 
altogether, a percentage of 94.53% of easy access answers is registered in 2000, but this 
percentage decreases in the following years.  
Table 11 shows the distribution of the answers on water supply service prices. The overall 
percentages of fair judgement on service prices are only 58.05% in 2000, but it increases in 
2002 (+2.19%) and in 2004 (+15.25%). Among countries, Luxembourg (with 88.24% in 
2000) has a good rate of satisfaction, whereas Italy (with 48.4% in 2000) has a bad one. 
Greece registered the highest positive difference in judging unfair or excessive  the prices 
both in 2002 and in 2004 and Belgium registered the lowest one both in 2002 and in 2004.   
Quality has been judged fairly or very bad in Italy, Greece and Portugal (as for the case of 
electricity service, with Italy in the place of Spain) and very or fairly good in countries like 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Table 12). Quality standards are generally 
considered almost in the same way as price levels: overall, a percentage of 92.8% of the EU15 
citizens considers very or fairly good the water supply service quality in 2000. This 
percentage still remains similar in the following years. 
 
Table 11. Valid Answers on water supply services access – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
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2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access No Access 
Difficult 
Access 
Easy 
Access 
Austria 4.05 4.67 91.28 -2.21 1.75 0.47 -2.73 2.89 -0.16
Belgium 0.48 5.76 93.76 0.88 2.65 -3.54 0.22 -0.19 -0.03
Denmark 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.45 -0.45 1.38 2.29 -3.67
Finland 4.41 3.43 92.16 -1.44 0.03 1.41 -2.10 2.12 -0.03
France 0.42 2.92 96.66 1.07 3.84 -4.91 0.41 2.04 -2.45
Germany 2.70 7.58 89.73 -0.49 2.18 -1.69 1.98 -2.12 0.15
Great Britain 0.37 1.00 98.63 0.55 2.14 -2.69 -0.04 0.47 -0.43
Greece 0.67 8.31 91.01 0.68 -1.99 1.31 -0.67 -5.81 6.49
Ireland 2.68 1.34 95.97 -1.32 0.70 0.63 -0.68 -0.01 0.69
Italy 0.00 5.80 94.20 2.73 5.37 -8.09 3.11 5.07 -8.18
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 5.26 -5.26 0.00 5.56 -5.56
Netherlands 0.00 3.14 96.86 0.51 2.76 -3.27 0.64 3.87 -4.50
Portugal 2.17 6.04 91.79 0.23 3.82 -4.05 1.51 -1.12 -0.39
Spain 0.30 3.90 95.80 0.12 0.04 -0.16 1.94 6.99 -8.93
Sweden 4.13 0.55 95.32 -2.76 1.09 1.67 -3.86 1.05 2.81
Total 1.08 4.39 94.53 0.53 2.59 -3.12 1.07 1.67 -2.74
Table 12. Valid Answers on water supply service  prices – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair Excessive Unfair Fair 
Austria 8.70 18.06 73.24 -2.53 4.02 -1.49 -2.40 -11.37 13.76
Belgium 15.06 33.83 51.11 -5.18 -7.71 12.89 -7.90 -23.60 31.50
Denmark 5.12 25.58 69.30 0.17 -1.54 1.37 -5.12 -14.92 20.04
Finland 0.53 25.13 74.33 1.07 -0.53 -0.53 0.03 10.26 -10.29
France 23.90 27.48 48.62 -5.16 6.41 -1.25 -14.79 0.71 14.08
Germany 6.09 40.51 53.40 -0.43 -3.08 3.51 10.09 -29.71 19.62
Great Britain 7.00 25.66 67.34 -3.60 -2.80 6.40 -6.01 -14.24 20.25
Greece 4.51 17.61 77.88 -1.10 17.47 -16.37 1.43 14.43 -15.86
Ireland 2.56 11.97 85.47 -0.71 -3.63 4.34 1.67 -5.19 3.51
Italy 19.03 32.60 48.37 -0.27 1.50 -1.23 -5.19 -5.26 10.45
Luxembourg 5.88 5.88 88.24 5.88 0.00 -5.88 -5.88 12.87 -6.99
Netherlands 6.14 15.75 78.11 -4.20 -0.06 4.25 -2.92 -9.14 12.05
Portugal 7.31 39.95 52.74 -3.30 -0.11 3.41 -2.63 -10.75 13.37
Spain 10.34 30.34 59.32 -7.24 3.22 4.01 -3.83 -8.17 12.00
Sweden 3.20 19.22 77.58 -2.20 -10.19 12.39 -2.90 -12.51 15.41
Total 11.76 30.19 58.05 -2.95 0.76 2.19 -3.37 -11.88 15.25
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Table 13. Valid Answers on water supply service quality – Years 2000, 2002, 2004 - Percentages 
2000 Diff 2002 Diff 2004 
 Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good Very Bad 
Fairly 
Bad 
Fairly 
Good 
Very 
good 
Austria 0.64 2.24 26.20 70.93 -0.33 0.52 8.36 -8.54 -0.64 -0.69 10.87 -9.54
Belgium 0.48 3.37 56.14 40.00 -0.03 -0.67 -6.60 7.30 0.02 -0.85 -7.91 8.74
Denmark 0.00 0.45 30.18 69.37 0.00 2.29 -0.50 -1.79 0.00 1.02 -3.71 2.69
Finland 1.04 1.55 51.30 46.11 -0.52 0.51 -3.87 3.89 -1.04 1.18 -0.48 0.33
France 1.10 5.87 58.09 34.94 0.00 0.71 3.71 -4.41 0.19 -1.35 1.49 -0.33
Germany 1.32 7.14 57.75 33.78 -0.90 -1.04 3.71 -1.77 -1.24 -5.13 -0.78 7.16
Great Britain 1.02 3.01 45.10 50.87 -0.09 0.19 1.21 -1.31 0.07 0.16 5.98 -6.21
Greece 1.36 8.64 53.86 36.14 1.14 0.00 5.00 -6.14 0.01 -0.15 11.73 -11.60
Ireland 1.42 3.55 31.21 63.83 -0.04 -0.79 3.97 -3.14 0.11 0.27 0.86 -1.23
Italy 3.13 10.55 67.39 18.92 -0.58 0.66 4.10 -4.18 -2.14 -0.40 7.47 -4.92
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 38.89 61.11 0.00 5.56 0.00 -5.56 0.00 0.00 8.17 -8.17
Netherlands 0.16 0.79 39.05 60.00 0.01 1.04 13.87 -14.92 0.02 0.45 -2.23 1.77
Portugal 0.51 7.93 77.49 14.07 1.27 3.27 2.15 -6.69 -0.24 -2.48 6.98 -4.26
Spain 1.08 4.93 73.84 20.14 -0.24 1.56 -7.56 6.24 0.19 1.81 -1.39 -0.62
Sweden 0.30 1.19 34.63 63.88 0.57 0.25 -14.11 13.29 -0.30 0.19 -10.74 10.84
Total 1.35 5.85 56.79 36.01 -0.27 0.34 1.70 -1.77 -0.58 -1.29 1.67 0.20
5. A conditional analysis of consumers’ satisfaction 
Although informative, the results presented in previous section do not allow to see whether 
there is any pattern in satisfaction across groups of consumers and across countries. In this 
section we try to shed some light on this issues. We analyse consumers’ satisfaction with 
fixed telephone, gas, water and electricity supply across the dimensions of access, prices and 
quality, depending on a set of information about each respondent and the country she lives in. 
As satisfaction to different SGI are coded with ordinal variables, we use an ordered logit 
model for each of them, across the dimension of access, price and quality. By using this 
model we assume that the true level of satisfaction for each service and each dimension, *S , 
is unknown and is determined by 
   * ,     |   (0, / 3)S e e π= + Λxβ x      (1) 
where  is 1K ×β , x  does not contain a constant, and (0, / 3)πΛ  stands for standard logistic 
distribution. Hence, we define our stated level of satisfaction S  as: 
 
*
1
*
1 2
*
0 if
1 if
if J
S S
S S
S J S
α
α α
α
= ≤
= < ≤
= >
M
 
where 1 2 ... Jα α α< < <  are unknown cut points. As satisfaction on SGI access takes three 
values (no access, difficult and easy access), on SGI prices takes three values (excessive, fair, 
unfair) and on SGI quality takes four values (very bad, fairly bad, fairly good, very good), 
2J =  for access and price satisfaction and 3J =  for quality satisfaction. 
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As controls, x , we used a set of individual characteristics (including sex, age, marital status, 
age when finished education, occupation, political views, contribution to Household inc. and 
Household inc., resp.nt’s cooperation as assessed by interviewer), of country fixed-effects, 
year dummies, some country-level macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, Gini index, 
population density, public procurement values, social benefits, subsidies to producers, total 
government expend.s and revenues) and some regulatory indicators of entry regulation, public 
ownership, market structure and vertical integration.  
All information about individual characteristics are provided by Eurobarometer databases 
EB53 (for year 2000), EB58 (for year 2002) and EB61.2 (for year 2004). Although the 
structure of the questionnaire is remained substantially unchanged across these three years, in 
the 2004 issue there is no information about economic variables (respondent’s contribution to 
Household inc. and Household inc.): when these important variables are included in the 
model, the whole EB62.1 is left out of the analysis and comparisons of remaining coefficients 
across models are exploited for assessing robustness of results. Macroeconomic variables are 
obtained by Eurostat. Regulatory variables are obtained by REGREF, an OECD regulatory 
database (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). We used some of the variables contained in this 
database. In particular, we used the variable “entry regulation”, which is a weighted average 
of legal conditions of entry in a market and is coded from 0 (free entry) to 6 (franchised to 
one firm), available for telephone, gas and electricity; the variable “vertical integration”, 
which is an indicator of vertical separation in different industries and is coded from 0 
(ownership separation) to 6 (integration), available for electricity and gas; the variable 
“market structure”, which is an indicator of the market share of the incumbent and is coded 
from 0 (less than 50%) to 6 (more than 90%), available for telephone and gas; the variable 
“public ownership”, which measures the public ownership of each SGI and is coded from 0 
(private ownership) to 6 (public ownership), available for telephone, gas and electricity. 
Unfortunately, none of these regulatory variables are available for water supply. In the present 
analysis we considered these variables lagged one period for each year (i.e. for years 1999, 
2001 and 2003), as interviews were run before years 2000, 2002 and 2004 were completely 
over. 
All models were estimated by maximum likelihood using pooled datasets and a year-fixed 
effect dummy was introduced to capture any trend. 
Tables 14-17 present results, where coefficients reported are the coefficients of model (1): 
although they cannot be interpreted as marginal effects and their magnitude has no economic 
meaning, a positive sign shows that the J  outcome is more likely and a negative sign shows 
that the outcome 0 is more likely.  
Looking at personal characteristics, we can notice that on average female with respect to 
males are significantly less satisfied with prices for all SGI considered, more satisfied with 
telephone access, while there is no significant particular difference of opinion as far as quality 
is concerned. The older the respondent, the smaller is the satisfaction with prices and the 
larger that with access. Regardless of the SGI considered, more educated people are more 
satisfied with access and prices than people who exited the education system at younger age, 
although there is no significant difference concerning quality satisfaction. Looking at 
occupation variables, holding self-employment as the reference category, managers are more 
likely to be very satisfied than others with telephone, managers and other white collars are 
more likely to be very satisfied with price and quality of gas supply and managers, other 
white collars and manual workers are more satisfied with prices of electricity. Unemployed 
people are consistently across SGI more dissatisfied and students more satisfied than self-
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employed, especially with respect to price. As the Eurobarometer data sets also contain a 
question asking whether respondents have political views closer to the right or to the left, we 
also introduced this variable as control, finding that those who complain the most about 
considered SGI are people whose political views is closer to the left. With respect to those 
giving excellent collaboration to the interviewer, the lower the collaboration the more likely 
tend to be the individual satisfaction of different services, regarding quality, access and prices. 
Finally, looking at Household inc., results show that the level of satisfaction is higher the 
larger is total purchasing power. 
Let us now look at country fixed-effects. Due to the short length of the time series, 
collinearity between country dummies and macroeconomic indicators forces us to analyse 
them separately. Country coefficients show that there is large variability of consumers’ 
satisfaction looking at different countries across SGI. Holding Belgium as the reference 
country, we can verify some of the results of previous section. For instance, residents of 
Scandinavian countries result more satisfied than Belgians with respect to price for all SGI, 
although there are very dissatisfied with access to gas supply. South-Europeans are more 
dissatisfied with prices, even controlling for Household inc.. The UK is on the opposite side, 
constantly more satisfied than the reference country with respect to all SGI, evaluated across 
the dimensions of access, quality and price. 
Looking at macroeconomic indicators, results show that the more unequal a country, the more 
likely is the dissatisfaction of their citizens with respect to price, with the only exception of 
telephone services, that larger public procurement values tend to increase satisfaction, while 
subsidies to (all) producers have no clear effect. 
Regulatory variables show some interesting results. As for telephone services, the larger the 
market share of the incumbents, the lower satisfaction of access, price and quality; the closer 
to free entry the telephone market is, the more consumers are satisfied with access, although 
satisfaction with prices is instead reduced. Interestingly, in countries where public ownership 
is large, consumers are more satisfied with telephone services for all dimensions considered.  
As for gas supply, in countries with free entry into the market consumers are less likely to be 
satisfied with access, although there is no significant difference with respect to price and 
quality. The larger the share of the incumbent, the larger is satisfaction with respect to access 
and the lower that with respect to price and quality. Vertical integration results to have a 
negative impact on access satisfaction, a positive one on price and quality satisfaction. 
Analogously to telephone services, the larger the share of public ownership in the industry, 
the more consumers are likely to be satisfied. 
Finally, with respect to electricity, the probability of satisfaction increases with respect to all 
dimensions considered if the electricity industry is more vertically integrated, however it 
reduces if there is less free entry and if the share of public ownership is large. 
Although the time series considered is very short and any hint of a trend should be taken with 
caution, consumer satisfaction seems to improve in the very last survey considered, especially 
as far as prices are concerned, for all SGI considered. 
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Table 14: Ordered logit analysis of consumer satisfactions about fixed telephone 
 
Telephone: 
Access 
Telephone: 
Access 
Telephone: 
Access 
Telephone: 
Price 
Telephone: 
Price 
Telephone: 
Price 
Telephone: 
Quality 
Telephone: 
Quality 
Telephone: 
Quality 
female 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.024 -0.075*** -0.072*** -0.060** 0.000 0.000 0.018
age 0.016** 0.015** 0.033*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.005 -0.007* -0.011**
age squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
single -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.124* 0.021 -0.003 0.055 -0.081** -0.095*** -0.084**
separated/divorced/widowed -0.494*** -0.493*** -0.294*** -0.177*** -0.160*** -0.087** -0.102*** -0.094*** -0.047
age when finished education 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.144*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.061*** -0.010** -0.012** -0.004
(age at end educ.) squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manager 0,024 0.059 -0.066 -0.088* -0.037 -0.131** 0.063 0.096** 0.134**
other white collar -0,107 -0.088 -0.252** -0.051 -0.023 -0.098* 0.037 0.055 0.006
manual worker -0,117 -0.088 -0.180* -0.072* 0.003 -0.079 -0.041 0.002 -0.026
house person -0.396*** -0.369*** -0.299*** -0.039 -0.013 -0.070 0.067 0.083* 0.119**
Unemployed -0.469*** -0.460*** -0.385*** -0.320*** -0.258*** -0.226*** -0.128** -0.098* -0.094
Retired -0,142 -0.134 -0.096 -0.107** -0.069 -0.075 -0.011 0.005 0.014
Student 0.674*** 0.661*** 1.509*** 0.569*** 0.577*** 0.724*** -0.050 -0.057 -0.046
political views: center 0,048 0.041 -0.004 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.043 0.063** 0.065*** 0.058**
political views: right 0.299*** 0.296*** 0.234*** 0.001 0.000 -0.013 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.108***
political views: missing -0,029 -0.060 -0.262*** -0.341*** -0.074 -0.131**
resp.nt’s cooperation: fair -0.157*** -0.189*** -0.117** -0.010 -0.045* 0.038 -0.212*** -0.234*** -0.215***
resp.nt’s cooperation: average -0.367*** -0.392*** -0.163** -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.132*** -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.144***
resp.nt’s cooperation: bad -1.012*** -1.040*** -0.902*** -0.066 -0.089 0.122 -0.354*** -0.360*** -0.347***
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: least 0.277*** 0.040 -0.019
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: equal 0.174 -0.052 -0.074
Household inc.: II quartile 0.387*** 0.215*** 0.115***
Household inc.: III quartile 0.586*** 0.112*** 0.084**
Household inc.: IV quartile 0.586*** 0.364*** 0.252***
Denmark 0.829*** 1.822*** 0.952*** 1.019*** 0.566*** 0.572***
Germany 0.255** 0.445*** 0.878*** 0.948*** -0.505*** -0.581***
Greece 0.626*** 0.503*** -0.377*** -0.020 -0.917*** -0.875***
Italy -0,048 -0.004 -0.923*** -0.789*** -1.468*** -1.423***
Spain 0,084 0.832*** -0.335*** -0.286*** -1.116*** -1.123***
France 0.529*** 0.777*** 0.027 0.187** -0.414*** -0.323***
Ireland 0.466** 0.395 0.528*** 0.835*** 0.553*** 0.658***
Luxembourg 0,982 1.224 0.590* 0.757** 0.380 0.476
Netherlands 0.889*** 1.114*** 0.509*** 0.655*** 0.214*** 0.104
Portugal -0,128 -0.240 -0.289*** -0.181* -1.372*** -1.374***
Great Britain 0.822*** 0.826*** 1.204*** 1.250*** 0.062 0.118
Finland -0,256 0.161 0.426*** 0.779*** -0.113 -0.028
Sweden 1.241*** 1.316*** 0.699*** 0.856*** 0.609*** 0.570***
Austria 0,129 0.133 0.404*** 0.350*** 0.221** 0.229**
GDP, per capita -0.009*** -0.005** 0.011***
GINI -0.077*** 0.032*** -0.036***
PopDens 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
public procurement values, % GDP 0.284*** -0.060*** 0.241***
social benefit, % GDP -0.055*** -0.101*** -0.074***
subsidies to producers, % GDP -0.034 0.013 0.082**
total government expend., % GDP 0.085*** -0.159*** -0.072***
total government revenues, % GDP -0.104*** 0.085*** 0.048***
Entry Regulation: Tel -0.143*** 0.096*** 0.050*
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Market Structure: Tel -0.126*** -0.612*** -0.185***
Public Ownership: Tel 0.099*** 0.511*** 0.313***
year 2002 -0.101** -0.191*** -0.109** 0.109*** -0.163*** 0.116*** -0.162*** -0.181*** -0.159***
year 2004 -0.335*** -0.433*** 0.888*** 0.612*** -0.053* -0.027
Observations 45249 45195 30519 41184 41134 28912 41530 41478 29212
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 15: Ordered logit analysis of consumer satisfactions about gas supply 
 
Gas: 
Access Gas: Access Gas: Access Gas: Price Gas: Price Gas: Price 
Gas: 
Quality 
Gas: 
Quality 
Gas: 
Quality 
Female 0.026 0.025 0.152*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.096*** -0.007 -0.008 0.017
Age 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.026*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 0.002 0.001 0.000
age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
single -0.116*** -0.094** -0.070 0.032 0.020 0.051 -0.108*** -0.119*** -0.137***
separated/divorced/widowed 0.018 0.036 0.039 -0.013 -0.010 0.062 -0.057 -0.049 -0.019
age when finished education 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.038 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.070*** 0.013** 0.012** 0.044**
(age at end educ.) squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001**
manager 0.112* 0.153** 0.056 0.223*** 0.275*** 0.206*** 0.114** 0.149*** 0.152**
other white collar 0.040 0.103* 0.025 0.142*** 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.004 0.024 -0.014
manual worker -0.032 0.057 -0.042 0.028 0.079 0.105* -0.022 0.018 -0.014
house person -0.049 0.035 0.104 0.239*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 0.114** 0.136** 0.169**
unemployed -0.256*** -0.180*** -0.101 -0.167** -0.120* -0.124 -0.092 -0.052 -0.093
retired -0.010 0.052 0.046 0.132** 0.143** 0.193*** 0.130** 0.149*** 0.168**
student 0.577*** 0.630*** 0.664*** 0.778*** 0.748*** 1.091*** 0.279** 0.286*** 0.562**
political views: center -0.073** -0.121*** -0.063 0.017 0.017 -0.008 0.023 0.027 0.046
political views: right -0.078** -0.153*** -0.119** -0.014 -0.013 -0.061 0.086** 0.085** 0.073*
political views: missing 0.120** 0.143*** -0.083 -0.142** 0.055 0.024
resp.nt’s cooperation: fair 0.154*** 0.107*** 0.223*** -0.011 -0.031 -0.009 -0.205*** -0.214*** -0.198***
resp.nt’s cooperation: average 0.035 -0.083* 0.210*** -0.179*** -0.196*** -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.182*** -0.185***
resp.nt’s cooperation: bad -0.084 -0.310*** 0.032 -0.133 -0.154* 0.026 -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.413***
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: least -0.200*** 0.059 -0.027
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: equal -0.044 0.068 0.101
Household inc.: II quartile 0.223*** 0.142*** 0.055
Household inc.: III quartile 0.272*** 0.013 -0.034
Household inc.: IV quartile 0.265*** 0.159*** 0.201***
Denmark -1.896*** -1.807*** 0.701*** 0.782*** 0.845*** 0.842***
Germany -0.510*** -0.503*** -0.055 0.160* -0.625*** -0.701***
Greece -4.017*** -4.854*** 0.535 0.470 -0.955** -1.310***
Italy 0.416*** 0.271*** -0.864*** -0.756*** -1.317*** -1.169***
Spain 0.578*** 1.009*** -0.099 0.026 -1.101*** -0.996***
France -0.006 0.037 0.080 0.273*** -0.262*** -0.259***
Ireland -1.116*** -1.416*** 0.828*** 1.198*** 0.805*** 0.907***
Luxembourg -0.856*** -0.901** 0.939* 1.265** 0.268 0.309
Netherlands 1.247*** 1.362*** 0.571*** 0.655*** 0.321*** 0.237**
Portugal 0.308*** 0.112 -0.293*** -0.167 -1.591*** -1.492***
Great Britain 0.728*** 0.898*** 1.151*** 1.221*** 0.174** 0.251***
Finland -2.769*** -2.816*** 0.102 0.250 -0.957*** -1.011***
Sweden -4.374*** -4.536*** 0.601* 0.808** 0.557* 0.369
Austria -0.510*** -0.731*** 0.051 0.208 0.322*** 0.270**
GDP, per capita 0.059*** -0.018*** 0.001
GINI 0.469*** -0.123*** -0.131***
PopDens 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
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public procurement values, % GDP -0.087** 1.032*** 0.804***
social benefit, % GDP 0.353*** -0.025* -0.036**
subsidies to producers, % GDP 1.272*** 0.270*** 0.267***
total government expend., % GDP -0.468*** -0.020 -0.007
total government revenues, % GDP 0.367*** -0.026 -0.011
Entry Regulation: Gas 0.222*** -0.002 -0.003
Market Structure: Gas 0.210*** -0.431*** -0.317***
Vertical Intergration: Gas -0.590*** 0.199*** 0.162***
Public Ownership: Gas 0.131*** 0.186*** 0.172***
year 2002 -0.442*** -0.515*** -0.464*** 0.068** 0.174*** 0.064** -0.115*** -0.036 -0.128***
year 2004 -0.668*** -0.585*** 0.366*** 0.399*** -0.125*** -0.125***
Observations 42350 42350 28316 30809 30809 22491 31523 31523 23155
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 16: Ordered logit analysis of consumer satisfactions about water supply 
 
Water: 
Access 
Water: 
Access 
Water: 
Access 
Water: 
Price 
Water: 
Price 
Water: 
Price 
Water: 
Quality 
Water: 
Quality 
Water: 
Quality 
Female 0.046 0.043 0.116** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.093*** -0.007 -0.009 0.032
Age 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.020** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.010**
age squared -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
single -0.031 -0.049 -0.048 0.015 -0.011 0.004 -0.024 -0.060** -0.048
separated/divorced/widowed -0.127** -0.109** -0.148** 0.008 0.019 0.036 -0.025 0.002 0.007
age when finished education 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.053* 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.035** 0.007 0.008* -0.006
(age at end educ.) squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
manager 0.044 0.129 0.142 0.232*** 0.289*** 0.240*** 0.072 0.166*** 0.099*
other white collar -0.014 0.019 0.003 0.063 0.062 0.094* -0.011 0.003 -0.008
manual worker 0.209*** 0.293*** 0.203** 0.023 0.069* 0.106** -0.010 0.083** -0.003
house person 0.118 0.165* 0.187* 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.192*** 0.102** 0.128*** 0.149***
unemployed 0.227** 0.297*** 0.272** -0.215*** -0.174*** -0.186*** -0.099* -0.018 -0.119*
retired 0.123 0.160* 0.161 0.007 0.009 0.106* 0.094** 0.135*** 0.081
student 0.290* 0.302* 0.528 0.826*** 0.807*** 0.814*** 0.221** 0.254*** 0.071
political views: center 0.088** 0.099** 0.019 0.075*** 0.102*** 0.060** 0.065*** 0.107*** 0.080***
political views: right 0.073 0.079 -0.003 -0.016 0.023 -0.024 0.100*** 0.142*** 0.089**
political views: missing -0.154* -0.230*** -0.436*** -0.520*** -0.153*** -0.276***
resp.nt’s cooperation: fair -0.037 -0.091** 0.027 0.042* 0.008 0.054** -0.174*** -0.226*** -0.172***
resp.nt’s cooperation: average -0.180*** -0.216*** -0.012 -0.095*** -0.087** -0.078* -0.167*** -0.161*** -0.160***
resp.nt’s cooperation: bad -0.515*** -0.579*** -0.390*** 0.108 0.095 0.242** -0.388*** -0.416*** -0.341***
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: least -0.041 0.042 -0.024
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: equal -0.192 0.047 -0.017
Household inc.: II quartile 0.292*** 0.033 0.100**
Household inc.: III quartile 0.258*** -0.085** -0.024
Household inc.: IV quartile 0.191** 0.078 0.173***
Denmark 1.705*** 3.627*** 0.493*** 0.525*** 0.980*** 0.976***
Germany -0.467*** -0.386*** -0.132** 0.027 -0.408*** -0.504***
Greece 0.173 -0.024 0.185** 0.621*** -0.737*** -0.592***
Italy -0.434*** -0.217 -0.599*** -0.429*** -1.387*** -1.313***
Spain 0.036 0.676*** 0.079 0.260*** -0.940*** -0.835***
France 0.230* 0.358** -0.599*** -0.505*** -0.540*** -0.529***
Ireland 0.930*** 0.949*** 1.428*** 1.741*** 0.647*** 0.689***
Luxembourg 0.792 1.104 1.067*** 1.479*** 0.386 0.469
Netherlands 0.231 0.576*** 0.981*** 1.103*** 0.412*** 0.329***
Portugal -0.204 -0.195 -0.076 0.066 -1.400*** -1.410***
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Great Britain 1.210*** 1.169*** 0.590*** 0.640*** 0.102* 0.198***
Finland -0.107 0.050 0.317*** 0.802*** 0.073 0.114
Sweden 0.833*** 0.783*** 1.273*** 1.389*** 1.078*** 1.041***
Austria -0.137 -0.079 0.617*** 0.680*** 0.821*** 0.887***
GDP, per capita 0.005* -0.007*** 0.014***
GINI -0.041*** -0.116*** -0.137***
PopDens 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002***
public procurement values, % GDP 0.482*** 0.392*** 0.447***
social benefit, % GDP -0.020 -0.060*** -0.047***
subsidies to producers, % GDP 0.108 0.226*** 0.324***
total government expend., % GDP 0.017 -0.021** 0.047***
total government revenues, % GDP -0.024 -0.038*** -0.073***
year 2002 -0.501*** -0.495*** -0.489*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.110*** -0.084*** -0.072*** -0.083***
year 2004 -0.428*** -0.414*** 0.726*** 0.737*** 0.026 0.060**
Observations 44351 44351 29840 41457 41457 28647 42711 42711 29752
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 17: Ordered logit analysis of consumer satisfactions about electricity supply 
 
Electr.: 
Access 
Electr.: 
Access 
Electr.: 
Access 
Electr.: 
Price 
Electr.: 
Price 
Electr.: 
Price 
Electr.: 
Quality 
Electr.: 
Quality 
Electr.: 
Quality 
female 0.022 0.016 0.014 -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068** 0.006 0.004 0.043
age 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.030*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.008*
age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000**
single -0.052 -0.087 -0.044 0.023 -0.010 0.034 -0.071** -0.100*** -0.094**
separated/divorced/widowed -0.207*** -0.194*** -0.194** -0.046 -0.025 0.007 -0.047 -0.028 -0.033
age when finished education 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.065** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.086*** 0.008 0.004 0.009
(age at end educ.) squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.002** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000* 0.000 0.000
manager -0.072 0.020 -0.100 0.233*** 0.320*** 0.220*** 0.062 0.138*** 0.172***
other white collar -0.067 -0.042 -0.045 0.093** 0.107** 0.091* -0.061 -0.048 -0.031
manual worker 0.074 0.161** -0.108 0.063 0.148*** 0.120** -0.027 0.047 -0.002
house person -0.002 0.040 0.027 0.178*** 0.208*** 0.229*** 0.023 0.049 0.102*
unemployed 0.250** 0.325*** 0.263* -0.125** -0.049 -0.063 -0.047 0.015 -0.044
retired 0.096 0.132 -0.005 0.120** 0.146*** 0.218*** 0.046 0.074 0.098*
student 0.279* 0.284* 0.319 0.795*** 0.775*** 1.258*** 0.183** 0.161* 0.154
political views: center 0.056 0.096** -0.092 0.044* 0.076*** 0.011 0.051** 0.086*** 0.057**
political views: right 0.110* 0.144** -0.023 -0.012 0.016 -0.067* 0.112*** 0.144*** 0.099***
political views: missing -0.077 -0.189** -0.109** -0.253*** -0.121** -0.236***
resp.nt’s cooperation: fair -0.101** -0.157*** -0.131** -0.018 -0.079*** 0.003 -0.203*** -0.251*** -0.185***
resp.nt’s cooperation: average -0.373*** -0.391*** -0.251*** -0.233*** -0.256*** -0.217*** -0.165*** -0.160*** -0.129***
resp.nt’s cooperation: bad -0.457*** -0.495*** -0.245 -0.100 -0.138* 0.028 -0.373*** -0.374*** -0.319***
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: least 0.026 0.021 -0.071**
resp. contrib. to hh inc.: equal 0.028 0.049 0.031
Household inc.: II quartile 0.431*** 0.148*** 0.076*
Household inc.: III quartile 0.437*** 0.032 -0.006
Household inc.: IV quartile 0.350*** 0.189*** 0.157***
Denmark 1.846*** 4.087*** 0.640*** 0.740*** 0.964*** 0.953***
Germany -0.203* -0.225 0.201*** 0.448*** -0.402*** -0.518***
Greece 0.393** 0.031 -0.658*** -0.221** -0.904*** -0.738***
Italy -0.358*** -0.284** -0.696*** -0.501*** -1.361*** -1.291***
Spain 0.034 0.442*** -0.126* -0.021 -1.012*** -0.947***
France 0.426*** 0.541*** -0.090 0.068 -0.267*** -0.256***
Ireland 1.892*** 1.674*** 0.449*** 0.807*** 0.953*** 1.084***
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Luxembourg 0.972 1.287 0.873** 1.238*** 0.441 0.532
Netherlands 0.196 0.438** 0.763*** 0.925*** 0.256*** 0.183**
Portugal 0.548*** 0.349* -0.288*** -0.139 -1.496*** -1.503***
Great Britain 1.450*** 1.251*** 1.231*** 1.334*** 0.168*** 0.268***
Finland 0.513** 0.648** -0.103 0.480*** -0.102 -0.005
Sweden 1.280*** 1.169*** -0.053 0.409*** 0.562*** 0.611***
Austria 0.105 -0.009 0.267*** 0.396*** 0.658*** 0.740***
GDP, per capita 0.000 0.018*** 0.030***
GINI 0.007 -0.023*** -0.114***
PopDens 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
public procurement values, % GDP 0.352*** 0.234*** 0.349***
social benefit, % GDP -0.045*** -0.008 -0.033***
subsidies to producers, % GDP 0.106 0.365*** 0.310***
total government expend., % GDP -0.017 0.088*** 0.115***
total government revenues, % GDP 0.027 -0.121*** -0.136***
Entry Regulation: Ele -0.180*** -0.117*** -0.023**
Vertical Intergration: Ele 0.216*** 0.091*** 0.011
Public Ownership: Ele -0.009 -0.124*** -0.053***
year 2002 -0.617*** -0.672*** -0.612*** 0.026 -0.126*** 0.019 -0.152*** -0.193*** -0.154***
year 2004 -0.707*** -0.630*** 0.368*** 0.245*** -0.101*** -0.124***
Observations 44774 44721 30198 42485 42436 29344 43424 43372 30163
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has presented new findings on possible determinants of consumers’ satisfaction for 
four utilities in the EU 15 member states. Some countries, notably Italy Greece and Portugal 
show a significant extent of dissatisfaction, as compared with the benchmark we have  
selected, Belgium.  While some individual characteristics in the samples, and some 
macroeconomic controls may contribute to explain the degree of satisfaction in 
Eurobarometer surveys 2002 to 2004, in our concluding remarks we focus on the impact of 
regulatory variables. 
The utility reforms in Europe over the last twenty years have often assumed that efficiency 
and welfare would be enhanced by two institutional changes: privatization and liberalization. 
The two reforms are usually considered as related, but this is not always true, because in 
principle there may be liberalization without (full or partial) privatization of the incumbent; 
and because there may be privatization without (full or partial) liberalization. In fact in the EU 
and over time we can observe several patterns.  Thus, in this paper we ask a simple question: 
are consumers happier with SGI in countries where these reforms  have been implemented? 
Can we disentangle the effect on attitudes of privatization from liberalization?  
We could not use regulatory variables for water, so we focus in this comment of the other 
three utilities (for a summary of results, see Table 17). 
As for privatization, the OECD variable we use is the share of public ownership. Rather 
surprisingly, for telephone and  for gas, consumers are more satisfied with access, price and 
quality in countries where public ownership is large, but the reverse is true for electricity.  
One obvious measure of liberalization is the market share of the incumbent, and one would 
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expect that the smaller such share, the more competitive is the market, the lower the price for 
a given quality, and the higher the access, hence the higher consumers’ satisfaction. This 
expectation is rejected by data for gas access, where satisfaction is positively correlated with 
the market share of the incumbent. It is instead confirmed by data for gas quality and prices 
and for telephone across all dimensions. 
A second liberalization variable is ‘free entry’: this works as expected for electricity (on all 
dimensions), and for telephone access, but not for prices; for gas there is only a negative 
impact on access.  
Vertical integration in gas has a negative impact on access satisfaction, a positive one on price 
and quality satisfaction. In electricity consumers’ hare happier where systems are more 
vertically integrated. 
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Table 18: A summary of the effects of privatization, liberalization and vertical disintegration on 
consumers’ satisfaction 
 Effects on consumers’ satisfaction 
 Fixed Telephone Gas supply Electricity 
 Access Price Quality Access Price Quality Access Price Quality 
Public ownership 
(a smaller share of 
public ownership in the 
industry has…) 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
n.s. + 
*** 
+ 
*** 
Market structure 
(a smaller market share 
of incumbent has…) + 
*** 
+ 
*** 
+ 
*** 
- 
*** 
+ 
*** 
+ 
*** 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Entry regulation 
(a larger freedom to 
entry has…) + 
*** 
- 
*** 
- 
* 
- 
*** 
n.s. n.s. + 
*** 
+ 
*** 
+ 
** 
Vertical integration 
(a less integrated 
industry has...) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. + 
*** - *** - *** - *** - *** 
n.s. 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. n.a.= not available. n.s.= not statistically 
significant. 
 
We consider these findings preliminary for several reasons. First, we need to check more in 
depth the consistency of sampling over time and across countries, because there are some 
anomalies in Eurobarometer data in some countries; second, we would check the risk of 
misinterpretation of the accessibility question, because increasing ‘no access’ in 2004 as 
reported in some countries does not seem credible; third, some of the variables in the OECD 
regulatory database may not fully capture the reforms; fourth, the time structure needs to be 
handled carefully, because 2000-2004 is a very limited time span for structural reforms; fifth, 
some of our results might be affected by omitted variable bias and we need also additional 
research on macroeconomic controls. Finally, in future we need to cross-check consumers’ 
satisfaction with objective evidence. 
Having said this, our empirical findings show that any expectation of a simple EU-wide 
positive linear relation between the extent of privatization-liberalization utility reforms and 
consumers’ satisfaction does not seem supported by the available evidence.  
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